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El efecto del desempleo de la Gran Recesión en los pensionistas españoles 
 
Resumen. Uno de los impactos principales de la Gran Recesión ha sido el 
acrecentamiento en la tasa de paro. El desempleo ha tenido un impacto negativo sobre los 
salarios de los trabajadores que se ha trasladado a las pensiones, cuando los sistemas de 
cálculo de éstas últimas rentas dependían de aquellas. En este trabajo, se estima el impacto 
de estos efectos negativos en el sistema de pensiones español. De acuerdo con nuestras 
estimaciones, el pensionista medio padecerá una pérdida equivalente a 18 meses de pagos 
sobre la pensión inicialmente estimada. Adicionalmente, el riesgo de pobreza se estima que 
aumentará entre el 10,6 y el 24,6 por ciento debido a los efectos de la Gran Recesión. 
 
Palabras clave: Gran Recesión; Desempleo; Reforma de pensiones; Riesgo de 
pobreza.  





The Effect of the Great Recession Unemployment on Spain’s Pensioners 
 
Abstract. One of the main impacts of the Great Recession has been the increase in 
the rate of unemployment in Spain. Unemployment has a negative impact on the wages of 
workers, which, in those pension systems where pensions are computed according to wages, 
eventually affect pension benefits. In this contribution we estimate the impact of these 
detrimental effects on Spain’s pensioners’ welfare. According to our estimates the average 
pensioner is expected to lose the equivalent to 18 monthly payments of the initial pension 
entitlement. Additionally, the poverty risk faced by pensioners is estimated to increase 
between 10.6 and 24.6 per cent due to the effect of the Great Recession.  
 
Keywords: Great Recession; Unemployment; Pensioners’ Welfare; Poverty Risk; 
Pension reform. 













The Effect of the Great Recession Unemployment   
International Review of Economic Policy - Revista Internacional de Política Económica 




The importance of pension systems to prevent poverty situations among retired 
population has been empirically proven by many authors (Sainsbury and Morissens, 2002; 
Engelhardt and Grubert, 2004; Nelson, 2004; Dang et al. 2006). The ageing process 
phenomena and projections on future dependency scenarios, however, have led to the 
concern of the future sustainability of pensions systems. In an attempt to maintain the 
public nature of these systems, governments started to implement a series of reforms 
affecting, among other factors, the age of retirement and the method use to compute 
pension benefits. One of the main consequences of these reforms is the reduction of the 
replacement ratios provided to pensioners; that is to say, the percentage of the wage 
restored with the pension benefit. Accordingly, the welfare level enjoyed by the retirees is 
expected to be also negatively affected after the implementation of these reforms (Butrica 
et al., 2006; Lachance, 2008; Gonand and Legros, 2009; Pfau, 2006; Sutherland et al., 2008; 
Peinado and Serrano, 2011, 2012, 2014; Peinado, 2014).  
With the burst of the economic and financial crisis of 2007-2009, the debate on the 
necessity of reducing the expenditure on pensions gained importance. One of the effects of 
the Great Recession is the increase in the rates of unemployment. According to the data 
provided by the Spanish National Statistical Institute,2  by the end of the year 2012 the rate 
of unemployment in Spain was, and still is, twice higher than the one existing prior to the 
economic crisis. During the years 2007 and 2008 the rate of unemployment was equal to 8.5 
and 8.2 per cent respectively. After the burst of the economic and financial crisis, the rate of 
unemployment increased until it reached its highest value (26.1 per cent) in the year 2013. 
Years 2014 and 2015 show signs of recovery, with the latest rate of unemployment being 
equal to 22.1. However, according to the 2015 Ageing Report published by the European 
Commission (EC, 2015), the rate of unemployment registered before the burst of the crisis 
would only be recovered by the 2040s. Under these circumstances, the debate on the 
sustainability of pensions not only has it focussed on the ageing population process, but also 
on the consequences for public budget of an economy deeply affected by the 
unemployment that emerged with the Great Recession. As a consequence, pension system 
reforms have been designed assuming increasing dependency ratios of the population 
(which imply higher expenditure on pensions) and high rates of unemployment (which, from 
a pure macroeconomic perspective, imply lower revenues); thus, assuming a policy reform in 
the direction of the diminution of pension benefit most likely.  
However, empirical evidence has shown that unemployment may affect not only the 
revenues, but also the expenditure of the system. From a pure micro-economic perspective, 
unemployment implies breaks in labour careers that generate a reduction in the income 
earned by individuals during their working life.  According to Potrafke (2012), career 
interruptions imply two main income costs. The first cost is due to the fact of not having a 
job and, consequently, not being remunerated by a salary or wage. The second cost is 
related to human capital depreciation. According to this theory the longer the individual is 
unemployed, the higher is the capital loss and, consequently, the lower the wage drawn in 
subsequent jobs, which is assumed to reflect the productivity of the workers. The existence 
and development of welfare systems, such as the ones existing in Germany or Spain, allow 
fighting the first type of costs by partially or totally compensating the loss of these 
 
2 Data accessed in November 2016 at http://www.ine.es/jaxiT3/Datos.htm?t=4887 
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individuals. More concretely, in these types of systems institutions are designed to 
guarantee a certain benefit for the unemployed during the time they are actively seeking for 
a job, at least, during a defined period of time.  The second type of costs may be 
compensated by the existence of specific policies and institutions that guarantee a complete 
labour insertion of the workers who have been unemployed.  
Interestingly, when the unemployment phenomena are analysed, there is a point at 
which macroeconomics and microeconomics meet: namely, the wage curve; that is to say, 
the relationship between the rate of unemployment (macroeconomic variable) and real 
wages earned by individuals (microeconomic variable). Empirical evidence on the wage 
curve suggests that there is a negative causal relationship between unemployment and 
wages; that is to say, not only the wages of unemployed but the wages of all the workers in a 
given area are affected by unemployment phenomena. First publications on the wage curve 
estimated a value for the unemployment elasticity of real wages equal to -0.10 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990, 1994, 1995, 2000, 2005; Card, 1995). These estimates have 
been produced  for many years and evidence is now available for  different countries 
(Montuenga, García and Fernández, 2003; Baltagi and Blien, 1998; Baltagi, Blien and  Wolf, 
2000, 2012; Sanz de Galdeano and Turunen, 2005); these contributors conclude the 
existence of a significant and negative relationship between the rate of unemployment and 
real wages; that is to say, wherever the rate of unemployment is higher, real wages are 
lower.  
Whether it is because individuals have been unemployed at some point during their 
working lives or because they have developed a career in a region affected by high rates of 
unemployment, the wages of these workers are expected to be lower. Moreover, the 
detrimental effects derived from this wage diminution are not only noticeable during 
working lives but also during retirement, especially in those systems in which pensions are 
computed according to the wages earned by individuals. This is especially evident for public 
social security systems where pension benefits entitled at the age of retirement are a 
function of past wages (usually through contributions made by workers during their labour 
careers). Potrafke (2012) estimates the effects that career interruptions may have on 
German pension benefits. He concludes that the most controversial effects for pensioners 
are produced when the breaks in their labour careers are produced at the beginning of their 
working lives and the less controversial effects when the break is produced at the end of 
their working lives. Peinado and Serrano (2017) work on the hypothesis of the wage curve 
and extend it to pension benefits. They assume that, if unemployment is to negatively affect 
wages, in those systems in which pensions are computed according to past wages of 
individuals, the effect on unemployment must also be transmitted to pensions; and, 
consequently, the rates of unemployment faced during the working life must define, to an 
extent, the pension benefit entitled for the pensioners in these systems. In order to advance 
in this direction they estimate the unemployment elasticity of real pensions in Spain, 
concluding that the existence of a negative relationship between unemployment and the 
regulatory base3 of the pension is equal to -0.135. 
Under these circumstances, the argument for the reform of pension systems to work 
in the direction of reducing expenditure on pensions is not straightforwardly supported. In 
fact, due to unemployment increase during the Great Recession, the pension benefits in the 
 
3 The Regulatory Base is the component of the pension computed according to the contributions made by 
individuals during their working lives.  
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type of systems mentioned above, are expected to diminish and, as a consequence, to cause 
a loss of welfare for the generations of affected pensioners.  
Research on the effects of the Great Recession on pensioners, mainly developed for 
the US, has focused on investigating retirement decisions and security. In those systems in 
which the age of retirement may be delayed, individuals who in a job decide to retire later 
after the recession in an attempt to guarantee longer and higher income paths during 
retirement (Johnson, Smith and Haaga, 2013). However, unemployed elderly people tend to 
retire earlier to start drawing a pension benefit to compensate, in the short run, income loss 
or diminution (Bosworth, 2012).  Some authors have shown that, as a consequence of the 
financial losses during the recession, workers and retirees have changed their consumption-
saving patrols (Hurd and Rochwedder, 2012; Argento, Bryant, Victoria and Sabelhaus, 2015).  
Dushi et al. (2013) estimates the effect of the Great Recession on workers' participation and 
contribution decisions in the US finding a diminution in the proportion of workers who 
decreased or even stopped contributing to the pension system as well as a the existence of a 
link between the amount contributed and the diminution in the earnings registered during 
the crisis.  
However, and even when social security has proven to be a major source of income 
(Fichtner, Phillips and Smith, 2012), few contributors have focused on investigating the 
effects that the Great Recession may imply for the welfare enjoyed by retirees. Munell and 
Rutledge (2013) conclude that, given the decline in resources, the Great Recession has had a 
profound effect on the retirement security of older American population. They show that 
insufficient economic and health coverage may shorten lives of retired population, advising 
policymakers on the necessity of support social security and develop a more robust 
retirement income system. Butrica, Johnson and Smith (2011a, 2011b) use a simulation 
model in the Urban Institute named DYNASIM3, to measure the impact of the Great 
Recession on future retirement incomes in the US. They find that the recession effectively 
reduces earnings, resulting in permanently lower Social Security benefits and literally “an 
unexpected blow to the oldest boomers’ retirement security, a growing concern for many 
even before the economy faltered” (Butrica, Johnson and Smith, 2011b, p2). 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no contribution estimating the effects that due 
to the macro-micro-economic relationship between unemployment and wages, the increase 
in the rate of unemployment during the Great Recession is expected to have on the welfare 
level enjoyed by future retirees. However, as some authors reveal,4 advancing knowledge in 
this topic is an issue of major relevance for policy makers to design adequate proposals to 
avoid poverty situations among retired population. The aim of the present paper is, 
precisely, to estimate this effect; that is to say, the effects that the increase in the rate of 
unemployment during the Great Recession may have on the welfare level of future 
pensioners. In order to reach this goal we combine estimation and simulation techniques to 
estimate a model for the Spanish pension system. The latter allows estimation  in terms of 
poverty, the dynamic impact that the macroeconomic variable ’unemployment’  has on the 
microeconomic variable ’pension benefit’, which may eventually affect  the evolution of the 
level of welfare enjoyed by retired population.   
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the Spanish pension system. 
Section 3 describes the data and methodology used. Section 4 contains the main empirical 
results.  Finally, section 5 summarises and concludes. 
 
4 Maurer, Mitchell and Warshawsky (2011) advise on the necessity to better understand and literally 
‘reengineering retirement pensions’ to improve retirement security. 
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2. The Spanish Pension System 
 
The Spanish pension system is defined as an unfunded pay-as-you-go social security 
system. During their working lives workers make contributions to the public administration 
(social security system). These contributions have a double function. On the one hand, the 
amount of contributions gathered by administration each of the years of reference is used as 
a source to financing pension benefits to current retirees. On the other hand, the 
contributions made, as well as the number of contributed years, are recorded by the 
relevant administration to create a contributor’s profile; namely the volume of 
contributions, the number of years of the contributions and age of retirement. These 
features will be used in the future to compute the corresponding pension benefit. 
There are different schemes of contributions:5 i) the general scheme, which 
comprises several minor schemes and concentrates 81 per cent of contributors;6 ii) the 
scheme for self-employees; iii) the scheme for fishers and, iv) the scheme  for miners. The 
work we present uses data for the general scheme.7  
In the general scheme, the amount of contributions is used to compute the 
regulatory base 𝑅𝐵𝑖  of each individual i. More precisely, the last fifteen years of taxable 
average earnings are taken into account on a monthly basis to compute the value of the 
regulatory base as in expression (1) 
     
𝑅𝐵𝑖 =
∑ 𝑤𝑡













𝑖 are the taxable average earnings or wage8 contributed to the pension system by 
individual i in  month t and 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡 is the consumer price index at month t. As  the above 
expression shows, the last two years of contributions (months 1 to 24) are computed at their 
nominal value, while the contributions made during the previous 13 years (months 25 to 
180) are brought-up to the 25th month prior to retirement according to the consumer price 
index. Contributions to the social security system are made on a monthly basis, that is to say, 
 
5 The relevant classification utilised  is undertaken by the social security administration for the year 2016. 
Available at: http://www.seg-social.es/Internet_1/Trabajadores/Afiliacion/Informaciongeneral/index.htm. 
Access date: November, 2016. 
6 According to the last report published by the Spanish ministry of employment and social security (2016), from 
17,194,357 affiliates 13,892,446 (81 per cent) are registered in the general scheme; 3,149,472 (18 per cent) in 
the scheme for self-employed, 58,891 in the scheme for fishers and 3,548 in the scheme for miners. The 
remaining 11,101 individuals are classified as carers.   
7 We use this scheme for two main reasons. First, because of its representativeness within the national context. 
Second, in view of the estimates in this paper are computed for the pensioners in the general scheme, it 
follows that using any other scheme would bias the results of our estimates.  
8 The social security system defines a maximum pension and, accordingly, a maximum amount of contributions.  
Taxable average earnings are the same as the wage earned by individuals but for those whose wage is higher 
than the maximum defined. In year 2016 the maximum amount of contribution was equal to 3,642 euros. 
Given the aim of our study and adopted methodology,  which use the rate of poverty to quantify welfare, the 
existence of top boundaries are not determinant and, consequently, we can  use the term ’taxable average 
earnings’ or ’wages’. Similarly, there is a minimum quantity or lower bound of contributions as well as a 
minimum pension benefit, which is different for the different types of workers. As an example, in the year 
2016, the minimum varied between 764.40 to 1,067.40 euros per month. Available at http://www.seg-
social.es/Internet_1/Trabajadores/CotizacionRecaudaci10777/Regimenes/RegimenGeneraldelaS10957/Inform
acionGeneral/index.htm Access date: November, 2016. 
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12 contributions per year worked. However, the amount of pensions drawn per year is 
divided into 14 payments – one payment per month plus two extra payments (one in June 
and another in December)-. For this reason the number of months included in the 
numerator of expression (1) is 180 –fifteen years times twelve contributions per year- while 
the number of months included in the denominator is 210- fifteen years times fourteen 
payments per year.  
The number of years contributed and the age of retirement are used to define the 
percentage of the regulatory base that would finally be entitled to the individual. This 
percentage is known as the ‘coefficient applied to the regulatory base’. According to the 
number of years contributed, the coefficient may vary from being equal to 50 per cent for 
those individuals who have contributed for 15 years - which is the minimum, required to 
draw a pension- and 100 per cent for those who have contributed for 35 or more years.9 The 
legal age of retirement is established at the age of 65. Early retirements are penalised with a 
reduction in the coefficient applied equal to 8 percentage points per year prior to the legal 
retirement age and retirement after the age of 65 implies an increase in the coefficient 
applied equal to 2 percentage points per year, being 70 the maximum age at which the 
individual may retire. Accordingly, the final pension benefit entitled is defined as in 
expression (2)10,  
 
𝐵𝑖0 = 𝜂𝑖𝑅𝐵𝑖 
 
(2) 
where the final pension benefit entitled 𝐵𝑖0 at the initial year t=0  is determined by the 
product between the individual coefficient 𝜂𝑖 of individual i and the corresponding 
regulatory base 𝑅𝐵𝑖of that individual. 
Once the pension is entitled, the new pensioner starts to draw the monthly benefit 
𝐵𝑖0 for a year (or the remaining months until the natural year ends) plus two extra 
payments; one in June and another one in December. From this time   on, each New Year 
pensions are brought up to date according to an index, which is previously defined by the 
corresponding government in terms of the Social Security budget approved in same year. 
Until 2012, the index used to calculate pension benefits was the Consumer Price Index. After 
the Social Security reform of 2011,11  the estimated coefficient is yearly approved by law, 
and being the minimum coefficient equal to 0.25 per cent increase and the maximum equal 
to the value of the increased registered for the CPI in the year plus 0.5 per cent.12 Estimation 
is undertaken multiplicatively; that is to say, the total amount of pension benefit is yearly 
brought-up-to-date as in expression (3): 
 
 
9 Each additional year of contribution implies a 3 percentage point increase in the coefficient. This increase is 
applied until the 25th year contributed. Contributing one additional year from 26 to 35 implies an increase in 
the coefficient of 2 percentage points.  
10 From the first of January of 2013 the regulatory base is computed according to the Spanish Official Law BOE-
A-2011-13242. In order to reach our aim, that is to say, to account for the effects of the Great Recession we 
need to distinguish between the effect of unemployment on pensions and the effect of the reform. Using data 
prior to the recession is an issue of major relevance, thus, to achieve our porpoise. Accordingly, in order to 
implement our analysis we pay attention to the regulation existing before the recession. This allows computing 
the counterfactual scenario and estimating the expected effect of the Great Recession.  
11 Spanish Official Law BOE-A-2011-13242 
12 Spanish Official Law BOE-A-2013-13617.  
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where 𝐵𝑖𝑡 is the monthly pension benefit drawn by pensioner i at year t, 𝐵𝑖0 is the 
corresponding initial pension drawn during the  year in which the pension was legally 
recognised and 𝑟𝑡 the revalorisation factor applied according to the corresponding law for 
year t and T the last year of interest. 
   
3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
3.1. Data 
The study is implemented using the Spanish Survey of Continued Labour Careers or 
its Spanish acronym MCVL for the period 2005-200813, available on request from the Spanish 
Ministry of Work and Social Security. The data, which comprises several sub- data sets, 
matches personal features of the individuals such as gender or education from census data,  
compiled by the Ministry regarding the labour (industry sector or contributory group) and 
pension (regulatory base, coefficient applied, number of years of contribution) related 
characteristics of the individuals.  Obviously, only for those individuals who, in a given year 
of reference have been workers and become pensioners are all these characteristics 
available at the same time. For those who are only workers or only pensioners, during the 
reference period, the relevant features cannot be matched. Consequently, the analysis in 
this paper has been implemented for those pensioners for whom complete information is 
available; that is to say, for the people who retire during each of the years of reference from 
2005 to 2008.  
Having complete information for these individuals is an issue of major relevance, 
given the aim of the paper. We aim to quantify the effects that the increase in the rate of 
unemployment during the Great Recession may have on the welfare level of pensioners who 
have not been unemployed during the years prior to retirement.14 Thus, it is important to 
identify the pensioners who are unemployed by the time they retire and leave them out of 
the study. As may be drawn, the pensioners we leave out of the study not only would they  
be affected by the macroeconomic effect of unemployment on wages but also by the 
microeconomic one, that is to say, having been unemployed.15 Accordingly, we use the 
pensioners for whom complete data is available and, afterwards, we leave out of our study 
those pensioners who enter the pension system from an unemployment situation; thus, 
including in the study only those workers who retire from  employment. Obviously, these 
pensioners are the ones whose wages reflect the macroeconomic effect of unemployment 
on pensionable earnings and consequently, on pensions.  
 
13 Notice that using the period prior to the burst of the Great Recession is important to prevent pensions 
including the effect of the increase in unemployment; that is to say, to prevent estimates’ bias. 
14 We do the estimates for a subset of pensioners in Peinado and Serrano (2017). This enables us to use their 
estimates to account for the effects of the Great Recession.  
15 One of the problems of the data is that it is not possible to identify career interruptions for the fifteen years 
prior to retirement when pensioners enter the system form a job. However, Peinado and Serrano (2017) show 
that the estimates are robust in this respect, and, accordingly, we can undertake the estimates in this paper 
using their result.  
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As will be explained in the empirical methodology, we approach the concept of 
welfare in terms of the monetary poverty related to the pension benefit entitled, for which 
we define poverty as the 60 per cent of the median  income published by Eurostat (2016). 
3.2. Empirical Methodology 
In order to implement the analysis, we combine estimation and simulation 
techniques to estimate the dynamic evolution of the poverty rate faced by retired 
population in Spain during the time they are expected to draw a pension benefit, which is 
estimated to be equal to 22 years.  
In a first step we select the value of the regulatory base for each pensioner in the 
dataset and deflated it to 2005 euros16 to identify the real value of the regulatory bases in 
the data.17 Subsequently, we propose two different scenarios. The first scenario, or 
counterfactual, called in this paper ‘Before the Great Recession’ provides the path of the 
pension benefit that each pensioner would draw for each of the years in which she/he is 
expected to draw a pension, that is to say, 22 years. In order to compute this value, we 
multiply the coefficient applied to each pensioner by the corresponding regulatory base and 
compute the initial pension benefit. This value is then brought-up-to date according to index 
applied by law18 to build the whole path of the expected pension benefit for the years that 
the individual is entitled the pension. The pensioners in our dataset enter the system 
between the years 2005 and 2008 and are expected to be drawing a pension for 22 years. As 
a consequence, the pensions of the individuals in our data have been brought up-to-date at 
the value defined by the corresponding social security law.19  
The second scenario ‘After the Great Recession’ is designed to account for the effects 
of the increase in the rate of unemployment due to the Great Recession. In this scenario the 
regulatory base of each pensioner is reduced to 5 per cent.20 Subsequently, the resulting 
regulatory base is multiplied by the corresponding coefficient for each pensioner in the 
dataset and, finally, brought up to date as undertaken for the counterfactual. Once the two 
paths of pension benefits have been built for each pensioner in the dataset, we define a 
simple dynamic non-parametric econometric model to estimate the consequences that the 
increase in unemployment, through the effects that it has on pension benefits, may imply for 
the whole retired population in Spain.  
Let 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑘 denote the poverty situation of pensioner i in year t under scenario k and  
𝑃𝐿𝑡 the poverty line at year t. Then, as shown in expression (4), the poverty situation 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑘 may 
be define as a dummy variable that takes the value of one for pensioner i when the benefit 
drawn at year t  𝐵𝑖𝑡




1   𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑖𝑡
𝑘 ≤ 𝑃𝐿𝑡
0   𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑖𝑡





16 Deflated according to data from the Spanish National Statistical Institute (INE). 
17 These real values are the ones used in Peinado and Serrano (2017).  
18 According to Spanish Social Security regulation, until the year 2012 pensions had been brought up to date 
according to the CPI. From 2013 on, pensions are brought-up to date according to a factor that is, at minimum, 
equal to 0.25 per cent and, maximum, equal to CPI plus 0.5.  
19 Until the year 2012 according to the CPI; from 2013 to 2017 it was equal to 0.25 given the change in 
regulation social security reform of 2011 (Spanish official laws BOE-A-2011-13242 and BOE-A-2013-13617). 
From 2018 on we assume a relevant factor equal to 0.25 per cent, which is the value that has been applied 
during the last years and, according to regulation, the minimum value to be applied. 
20 According to Peinado and Serrano (forthcoming) the increase in the rates of unemployment during the Great 
Recession are expected to generate a 5 per cent reduction of the regulatory base of Spanish pensioners. 
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Once the poverty situation for each pensioner i is detected for each of the reference 
years t, we use the Nelson-Aalen21 cumulative hazard function to estimate the cumulative 
probability of poverty 𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑡
?̂? at time t. The cumulative hazard function measures the total 
amount of risk that has been accumulated up to time t. The estimator proposed by the 
Nelson and Aalen function can be described as in expression (5). Where 𝑛𝑗
𝑘
 is the number at 
risk at time tj under scenario k, 𝑑𝑗
𝑘 is the corresponding number of failures at time tj, and the 
sum is over all distinct failure times less than or equal to t.  
𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑡










We then define the corrected cumulative probability of poverty 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑡 at t of 
scenario k as the cumulative risk of poverty at that year t corrected by the probability of 
being poor at time zero 𝑃𝑃0̂;  that is to say, at the year in which the pension is entitled
22  as 









𝐵 denote the corrected cumulative probability of poverty before the 
increase in the rate of unemployment registered as a consequence of the Great Recession, 
and  𝐶𝐶𝑃?̂?𝑡
𝐴 denote the corresponding probability after the Great Recession. We can then 
define the effect on poverty associated with the increase in this rate of unemployment 
𝐸𝑃𝑈𝐺𝑅̂ 𝑡 as in expression (7): 
 








A value of 𝐸𝑃𝑈𝐺𝑅̂ 𝑡 greater than zero would imply an increase in the cumulative 
probability of poverty for the retired population associated with the increase in the rate of 
unemployment during the Great Recession. As an example, a value of 𝐸𝑃𝑈𝐺𝑅̂ 𝑡 equal to 0.1 
would be interpreted as follows: the increase in the rate of unemployment registered during 
the Great Recession is expected to increase the cumulative poverty rate faced by pensioners 
at t by 10 per cent.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
Figure 1 shows the complete path of the expected average real pension for an 
individual during her/his life as pensioner. The evolution of two different values is 
represented: the value of the expected pension when the effect of the Great Recession is 
 
21 We use Nelson-Aalen rather than Kaplan-Meier survivor function for efficiency reasons (Klein and 
Moeschberger, 2003) but both functions could be used to implement the estimates for this contribution. 
22 Estimates for the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard assume that the population in the first year is not affected; 
that is to say, they are at risk but they are not still affected by the phenomena analysed. In our case, in which 
poverty is observed since the moment the pension is entitled, we correct the estimates of the function to 
obtain the value of the poverty rate that has been accumulated since the moment that the individual was 
entitled the pension benefit.  
The Effect of the Great Recession Unemployment   
International Review of Economic Policy - Revista Internacional de Política Económica 






















































0 5 10 15 20
  Pension Age  
Before Great Recession After Great Recession
 
not taken into account ’Before the Great Recession’ and the corresponding value when the 
effect of the Great Recession is computed ‘After the Great Recession’.  
 
Figure 1. Estimates of the Dynamic Evolution of the Average Pension Benefit in Spain Before and After the 
Great Recession 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
Before the Great Recession, pensioners had been expected to draw an average 
pension that evolved from a value equal to 1,415 euros per month for the first year, that is 
to say, the year in which the pension was entitled, to 1,743 euros per month for the last year 
of her/his life as pensioners. After the Great Recession, the corresponding values of the 
pension benefit are 1,345 and 1,656 euros respectively. Looking at the evolution of the 
pension benefits we reach two main conclusions: i) the Great Recession, through the 
increase in the rate of unemployment, is expected to generate a reduction of pension 
benefits equal to 25,258 euros; in other words, the average pensioner is expected to lose 18 
(one year and a half losses) of the monthly initial payments before the recession; and ii) as 
time passes by, the loss becomes higher. Concretely, the loss registered for the pension 
benefit during the first year is equal to 71 euros per month while at the end of the life it is 
estimated to be equal to 87 euros per month; that is to say, as time passes by or as pension 
’gets older’ the expected losses become greater. This is due to the method used to bring 
pensions up to date, which, as explained above, is multiplicative. Accordingly, even when the 
law establishes increases that must always be positive, the longer the pensioner is drawing 
the benefit the higher it will be the perverse effect that the Great Recession has on the initial 
pension, as shown by the estimates.  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the cumulative risk of poverty both before and after 
the Great Recession. It is observed that poverty risk increases as time passes by in both 
cases; that is to say, before and after the recession.  
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Figure 2. Dynamic Evolution of Corrected Cumulative Poverty Risk of Spanish Pensioners Before and After the 
Great Recession 
 
   
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
This phenomenon is explained by the fact that pension benefits are brought up to 
date according to indexes that do not take into account evolutions in productivity as does 
the median equivalent income, which defines the poverty threshold in the society. 
Accordingly, as pensioners become older the likelihood of being poor is greater for the 
pensioners who remain out of poverty.23 Additionally the value of the rate of poverty is 
almost stabilised from the fifth year on, suggesting that the first years of pensioners’ lives 
are critical to define poverty situations among the retired population.  
Table 1 shows the values for the corrected cumulative poverty risks before the Great 
Recession, 𝐶𝐶𝑃?̂?𝑡
𝐵 , after the Great Recession, 𝐶𝐶𝑃?̂?𝑡
𝐴, and the effect of the recession, 
𝐸𝑃𝑈𝐺𝑅̂ 𝑡, for each of the years during which the pension is drawn. Before the Great 
Recession the corrected cumulative risk of poverty evolved from 2.1 per cent in the first year 
to 5.1 per cent in the last year. However, after the Great Recession values increase to being 
equal to 2.6 per cent and 6 per cent respectively. As a conclusion, the impact of the increase 
in the rates of unemployment during the Great Recession is expected to increase the 
estimated risk of poverty among retired population between 10.6 and 24.6 per cent, this 




23 For further analysis on this issue see Peinado and Serrano (2011), Peinado and Serrano (2012) and Peinado 
(2014). 
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Table 1. Dynamic Evolution of the Corrected Cumulative Poverty Risk Before the Great Recession 𝑪𝑪𝑷?̂?𝒕
𝑩 , 
After the Great Recession 𝑪𝑪𝑷?̂?𝒕












1 2.07 2.58 24.6 
2 2.37 2.74 15.6 
3 2.55 2.82 10.6 
4 4.55 5.29 16.3 
5 5.08 5.97 17.5 
6 5.08 5.97 17.5 
7 5.08 5.97 17.5 
8 5.08 5.97 17.5 
9 5.08 5.97 17.5 
10 5.08 5.97 17.5 
11 5.08 5.97 17.5 
12 5.08 5.97 17.5 
13 5.08 5.97 17.5 
14 5.08 5.97 17.5 
15 5.08 5.97 17.5 
16 5.08 5.97 17.5 
17 5.08 5.97 17.5 
18 5.08 5.97 17.5 
19 5.08 5.97 17.5 
20 5.08 5.97 17.5 
21 5.08 5.97 17.5 
22 5.08 5.97 17.5 
                      Source: Authors’ estimates. 
  
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
To date one of the main objectives of public pension systems has been to provide a 
socially acceptable level of welfare to the retired population. However, the ageing 
population process, which implies higher expenditure on pensions and lower revenues 
enhanced by the burst of the Great Recession, which implies even lower revenues to face 
the payment of the pensions, have led the Spanish governments to implement a series of 
reforms to guarantee the sustainability of pension systems. These reformist scenarios, which 
mainly imply a reduction of the pension benefits provided and the subsequent diminution in 
the level of welfare enjoyed by the pensioners protected, had not taken into account the 
existence of the macro-micro-economic relationship between unemployment, wages and 
pensions. Increases in the rates of unemployment are expected to reduce wages and, as a 
consequence, for those pension systems in which pension benefits are computed according 
to the wages registered during the working life of individuals, pension benefits are expected 
to be lower. These lower benefits are expected to, on the one hand, diminish the 
expenditure on pensions and, on the other hand, affect the welfare level of the retired 
population.   
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In this contribution we estimate the impact of the increase in the rates of 
unemployment registered during the Great Recession on Spanish pensioners’ welfare. Our 
analysis is focussed on the relationship between unemployment, wages and pensions that 
empirical evidence suggests for Spain. According to our estimates the average Spanish 
pensioner is expected to lose the equivalent to 18 monthly payments of the initial pension 
entitled. Additionally, the poverty risk faced by pensioners is estimated to increase between 
10.6 and 24.6 per cent due to the effect of the Great Recession as estimated and shown 
above. That is to say, the welfare level of Spanish pensioners is expected to diminish due to 
the increase in the rate of unemployment during the Great Recession. Our main policy 
recommendation is for policy- makers to take into account the possible existence in their 
country or region of a relationship between the rate of unemployment and pension benefits. 
Wherever this relationship exists, it is expected for the increase in the rate of unemployment 
registered during the Great Recession to have a negative impact on the pensions and, 
consequently, the welfare level enjoyed by the future cohorts of retirees in the area that is 
expected to be lower. Accordingly, the challenge is to design reforms of the pension system 
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